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Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment: The Case of South Asia 




This paper empirically investigates the influence of corruption, bureaucratic quality and 
government stability on inward foreign direct investment (FDI) to major SAARC nations 
including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka over the period of 1985-2008. Owing to 
the long-term relationship with the host, absence of corruption and bureaucratic interventions 
are crucial location advantages of host countries, especially in case of countries lacking 
abundant natural resources to attract the foreign investors. The results through random effects 
panel estimation method indicate the significant effects of absence of corruption, honest 
public office holders, efficient bureaucracy and government stability for the foreign direct 
investors in SAARC nations. 
Keywords: FDI, Corruption, Bureaucratic Quality, Government Stability & SAARC 
JEL Classifications: C330, F210, F230, K420, & M160 
1. Introduction 
A spate of recent corporate scandals and failures in the developed world has made the 
fiscal conditions very tight at home and strained their ability to invest in the developing world 
(Shah, 2012a; Shah & Afridi, 2015). This has led to increased demand for enhanced 
transparency and stability in business and economic institutions governing the activities of 
multinational firms both in the industrialised, developed and non-industrialised developing 
countries (Shah, 2016a; 2017b; 2017d). In this scenario, the present study addresses the 
question that how effective the availability of a corruption free, state apparatus is, in affecting 
the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the members of South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It comprises of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. World Bank “World Developing Indicators” (WB, 
WDI) groups them as South Asia. 
The overseas investment decision of a multinational company (MNC) from a developed, 
industrialized nation to directly invest in a non-industrialised developing economy (Shah, 
2009; ) vis-à-vis investment possibilities in other developed industrialized economies or at 
home primarily emanates from a higher expected profitability in future (Campos & 
Kinoshita, 2003; Shah, 2013a; Shah & Khan, 2016). 
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However, the long-term character of FDI nurtures a relatively high degree of sensitivity of 
the foreign direct investors to risk perception (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Shah, 2016c; Shah 
& Gulelala, 2017). Corruption concerns an investor because it raises the costs of operation 
and heightens uncertainty about the economic environment that he/she has to tackle (Shah, 
2013b; 2018a). Moreover, corruption’s prevalence in the state apparatus and bureaucracy 
creates distortions in the market by providing preferential access to some companies to 
profitable market segments and causing bottlenecks for others thus discouraging 
organisational performance (Kawai, 2009; Shah, 2018b). Therefore, restricting the 
pervasiveness of corruption is important for FDI and the belief that foreign investors abhor 
arbitrary bureaucratic interference in their operations and their desire to exercise corporate 
governance in a transparent and fair regulatory and legal environment at least in the 
developing world seems natural (Altomonte, 2000; Shah, 2011a). 
Good institutions are expected to ensure the security of foreign investor’s property (Krifa-
Schneider & Matei, 2010), guarantee political stability, wane corruption, promote a good 
investment climate and improve business-operating conditions leading to increased FDI 
inflows (Shah & Faiz, 2015). These themes are germane and desirable for economies at 
different levels of development, and various regions of the world (Rodriguez, Siegel, 
Hillman, & Eden, 2006; Shah, 2011b). Nevertheless, they are particularly important for the 
developing countries devoid of abundant natural resources, such as the SAARC nations, to 
lure overseas investors (Shah & Qayyum, 2015). 
This study examines the influence of corruption’s existence on inward FDI in a sample of 
four South Asian developing nations namely Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka by a 
random effect panel estimation model for aggregate FDI inflows in the host economies from 
1985 to 2008. Appendix one summarises foreign direct investment into the developing 
countries and SAARC, whereas appendix two and three in these four countries individually. 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal are not included due to non-availability of data 
specifically their non-coverage by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group. PRS provide 
annual data for economies worldwide titled “International Country Risk Guide” (ICRG). 
Using government stability, corruption and bureaucratic quality that deal with transparency 
and efficiency of the state apparatus, it was found that they positively affect the incidence of 
FDI. Similarly, variables such as trade openness, market size and economic development 
from the conventional FDI literature continue to exert their significant influence. 
The main research objective of this paper is to investigate the possible effects of 
corruption free, state apparatus on inward FDI in SAARC. The choice of the South Asian 
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economies is based on data availability and the paucity of research studies exploring 
corruption - FDI nexus in SAARC. Therefore, it is expected that the current work in addition, 
to enhancing investors and researchers understanding of corruption’s influence on investors’ 
location choice, will surely be adding some new vistas of knowledge to the available limited 
literature on FDI and corruption association in the SAARC member states. 
1.1 Hypothesis of the Study: 
The hypotheses stated below are set in order to answer the objective of the current study: 
H0: Inward FDI in SAARC economies is not influenced by Corruption 
H1: Inward FDI in SAARC economies is significantly influenced by Corruption 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the corruption-FDI 
relationship. Section 3 describes the empirical model. Section 4 of the paper present results, 
analysis and addresses the empirical concerns. The paper concludes with section 5. 
2. Corruption & Foreign Direct Investment  
Corruption is generally defined as using public office authority for personal advantage 
(Wei, 2000b), wherein a civil servant, be it, a bureaucrat or elected, misuses her or his 
government job for individual benefits (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006)
2
. By doing this he/she not 
only distorts efficient resource allocation but also sow the seeds of rewarding incompetent 
business conduct through granting unearned deals, rights and contracts to unproductive firms 
in receipt of bribes, at the cost of innovative and capable companies, thus inhibiting the 
development of fair and efficient markets (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Shah, 2010; 2017c). 
Paying-off government officials is a regular business practice in some countries (Egger & 
Winner, 2005). There, firms have to offer bribes to acquire government contracts, import 
licences, export quotas and to obviate unexpected regulatory complications to which they 
otherwise will be subjected, to force them to grease the palms of the relevant authority. These 
payments make the government officials seeking bribes show extraordinary responsiveness to 
the “needs” of the foreign firms keeping them on “payrolls”. This makes corruption look like 
making possible difficult transactions and speeding up procedures that otherwise would be 
very sluggish and cumbersome. However, it needs to be kept in mind that toleration of 
dishonesty in some facets of public life may foster a downward spiral in which the 
malfeasance of a few will encourage others to engage in corruption over time, leading to 
pervasive corruption and undermining the legitimacy of the governing apparatus. Therefore, 
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here corruption is considered as “sand in the wheels of commerce”3 (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008 
page 13) as it increases the operation cost of a firm and can lead to the enactment of 
additional bylaws, by the corrupt officials, for the sole objective of extracting more bribes. As 
a result, firms face increased costs even if the contract is granted when compared to a 
competitive market. Additionally, payments to corrupt officials have no market value (Habib 
& Zurawicki, 2002) and the investors do not have recourse to a court in case of non-
fulfilment, as bribery is illegitimate (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). In this perspective corruption 
can be termed even as a “grabbing hand” as it promotes rent seeking behaviour, reducing 
multinational profits and productivity of local inputs, therefore, lowering the host market 
attraction for overseas investors. 
The prevalence of corruption in a society shows deficiency of respect and reverence for 
the rules, conventions and principles that administer commercial dealings in a community 
(Shah & Ali, 2016; Shah, 2018c). The inflow of FDI is likely to be negatively related to 
pervasiveness of corruption in the developing host economy because of its expected adverse 
effect on optimal productivity of the multinational enterprise (Seyoum, 2006; Shah, 2011c). 
Corruption necessitates paying bribes or extra efforts to obtain the concerned government 
officials’ permission to do business (Wei, 2000a). This manipulation of public office 
authority for vested personal gain is an implicit levy on corporations, increasing their 
overhead costs, and rotting motives to invest (Johnson, 2006). Therefore, corruption, by 
distorting the business environment generates ambiguity apropos operation costs in the host 
country and leads to operational inefficiencies (Woo & Heo, 2009). This may cause the 
overseas investors to withhold their investment and existing ones may even consider 
withdrawing theirs (Shah, 2012b; 2016b). The best example of the implications that rampant 
corruption as well as ill-functioning institutions have on foreign direct investors is the post-
communist Russia: 
“Bribery was the grease which kept the rusty Soviet State from jamming altogether” 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008, page 15). Moreover, “to invest in a Russian company, a foreigner 
must bribe every agency involved in foreign investment, including the foreign investment 
office, the relevant industrial ministry, the finance ministry, the executive branch of the local 
government, the legislative branch, the central bank, the state property bureau, and so on. The 
obvious result is that foreigners do not invest in Russia” (Drury, Krieckhaus & Lusztig, 2006, 
page 122-123). 
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Due to the secret nature of bribery, it seems quite difficult to get tangible evidence 
regarding the degree of corruption in the society. However, the indexes of Transparency 
International (TI) and ICRG are considered reliable measures of corruption. They are widely 
used by researchers in empirical studies associated with MNCs. This study is not using TI’s 
corruption perception index (CPI) because it starts at 1995 and even for that year it covers 
only Pakistan and India. For its earlier usage consult Wei (2000a), Habib and Zurawicki 
(2002), Johnson (2006), Kwok and Tadesse (2006), Afriyie (2008) and Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2008) among others. 
The present study checks for the effect of perceived corruption level on FDI inflows by 
utilising data from ICRG. In addition, it also checks for the effect of excess bureaucratic 
mingling on inward FDI from ICRG because excessive red tape increases costs of starting a 
business and may cause difficulties in enforcing contracts (Morrissey, 2008; Shah, 2011d; 
2014b). According to Egger and Winner (2005), corruption is a common characteristic of 
low-income countries. Similarly, Wei (2000b) articulates that majority of investors from 
overseas use Hong Kong as a stepping-stone to invest in mainland China because they loathe 
the high degree of corruption and bureaucratic red tape they have to face in the mainland 
Chinese provinces. The ICRG corruption measure is a six point index which gauge potential 
insidious corruption in the form of nepotism, excessive patronage, ‘favour for favours’, secret 
party funding, job reservations, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. The 
measure of bureaucratic quality is a four-point index. Both the indexes penalises high 
corruption or incompetent bureaucracy by granting them lower points. Therefore, a positive 
effect of the two indexes on inward FDI in SAARC economies is expected. 
3. Empirical Model and Data 
Multinationals choose production locations based on the expected optimal product of their 
innate ownership and internalisation advantages and the location specific benefits offered by 
the international host (Shah & Samdani, 2015). Domestic government stability, bureaucratic 
excellence and absence of corruption, determine the quality of investment climate and helps 
create the optimal location related conditions for the multinationals operations in the local 
market. 
A multinational FDI decision is likely to be influenced by an indefinite list of factors 
(Shah, 2011e; 2012d). This study will focus upon the demand side factors to explore the role 
of corruption on aggregate FDI inflows into four SAARC countries from 1985 to 2008. 
Accordingly, it will have a maximum of 4 * 24 = 96 observations for each variable. Based on 
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the prior discussion it is assumed that the function determining FDI inflows into South Asia 
can be estimated by the following log-linearized general specification: 
 𝒍𝒏𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒋𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒋𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐 𝒍𝒏 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒋𝒕 +𝜷𝟑 𝒍𝒏 𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒 𝒍𝒏 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝒋𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋𝒕 +𝜷𝟔 𝑩𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒖𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒋𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒋𝒕 + ℇ𝒋𝒕 … … (𝟏) 
 
Here ln denotes natural logarithm. Logging the data helps in reducing its skewness (Daude 
& Stein, 2007; Shah, 2015) and it is the standard statistical method to deal with this issue 
(Blonigen, 2005; Shah & Khan, 2017). Population of the host economy is used for market 
size (Shah & Jamil, 2016). Gross domestic product per capita proxies economic development 
(Shah, 2011f). Whereas, imports and exports as a percentage of GDP cater for the importance 
of both of them respectively. The data for FDI as well as these four variables is taken from 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Corruption, bureaucratic quality and 
government stability covers the phenomenon corresponding to their names. Data for them 
was collected from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Investors prefer large markets 
(Seyoum; 2006; Shah, 2012c), relatively developed economies (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; 
Woo & Heo, 2009 etc.) and countries open to world trade and investment (Krifa-Schneider & 
Matei, 2010; Shah, 2017a). Table one provides the summary of descriptive statistics for all 
the variables. 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variable No. of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Ln FDI 96 19.94 5.95 6.91 24.44 
Ln Population 96 18.18 1.45 16.29 20.87 
Ln GDP / PC 96 5.72 0.66 4.29 7.83 
Ln Imports % GDP 96 3.01 0.53 1.56 4.02 
Ln Exports % GDP 96 2.64 0.56 1.36 3.69 
Corruption 96 2.21 0.95 0.08 4.00 
Bureaucratic Quality 96 1.99 0.83 1.00 3.00 
Government Stability 96 6.62 2.62 1.83 11.08 
 
4. Results, Analysis & Empirical Concerns 
To choose between the appropriate panel data method the Hausman (1978) specification 
test was performed, which permits the use of random effects method as it is unable to reject 
the null with the following statistics Chi
2
 (4) = 2.62 and Probability > Chi
2
 = 0.6236. Though, 
the host countries are not randomly drawn from the pool of all the developing countries but 
selected based on their geographical position and data availability (Shah & Khan, 2018) still 
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the Hausman test suggests that the host country specific intercept is uncorrelated with the 
error term. Therefore, the study will use the random effect method for empirical estimations.  
Baum and Cox (1999) white test was carried out for heteroscedasticity, which confirms it 
with Chi
2
 (35) = 76.4396, P-value = 0.0000. Therefore, all the results are reported with 
standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity (Aizenman & Spiegel, 2006; Shah, 2014a). I also 
checked for the possible existence of problematic multicollinearity among the explanatory 
variables by using variance inflation factor (VIF) and the correlation matrix. Both show the 
absence of this issue as evident from the mean VIF of 7.77, which is less than the rule of 
thumb of 10.00 (Shah & Azam, 2018) as well as the correlation matrix given below as table 
two. 
Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
Correlations are rounded off to the nearest percentage 
Models one to four, table three confirms the findings prevalent in the FDI literature about 
multinationals preference for the host nation’s size of the native market, its development 
level, extent of openness of domestic economy and integration with rest of the world (Shah & 
Zeb, 2017). The coefficient for market size, development level and openness of the host 
market are all significantly positive in almost all the models. To explore the effect of 
corruption, bureaucratic quality and government stability on FDI inflows I employed the 
relevant indicators from ICRG, and the results are presented in table three models six, seven 
and eight. 
In model six, I look for the effect of corruption on foreign investment. The strong positive 
coefficient indicates that multinational firms prefer corruption free countries (Gastanaga, 
Nugent & Pashamova, 1998). For empirical analysis where increased corruption promotes 
FDI, see the findings of Egger and Winner (2005) for a set of seventy three developed & 
developing countries and Adam and Filippaios (2007) for a sample of 105 developed and 
developing countries. Egger and Winner (2005) supporting their results terms corruption as 
the “helping hand” for a firm’s operations and a stimulus for FDI. However,  
 
Variable a b c d e f g h 
a Ln FDI 100 %        
b Ln Population 27 % 100 %       
c Ln GDP / PC 58 % -28 % 100 %      
d Ln Imports % GDP 17 % -79 % 65 % 100 %     
e Ln Exports % GDP 40 % -62 % 75 % 91 % 100 %    
f Corruption 50 % -17 % 53 % 41 % 61 % 100 %   
g Bureaucratic Quality 73 % 45 % 41 % -04 % 27 % 64 % 100 %  




Table 3 Empirical Estimations 
 
 
Estimation Method Random Effects 
Variables Proxy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 










































































       
0.2489 * 
0.0909) 
R - Squared 13.04 % 42.58 % 43.93 % 43.34 % 43.97 % 65.84 % 67.48 % 69.37 % 
No of Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. * Represents significance at 1 % and α at 
5 % respectively. 
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Wei (2000a), analysing the effect of corruption on FDI inflows in forty five host countries 
from twelve source OECD countries found it to be negatively influencing the investors 
choice of investment location. On the contrary, like here Asiedu and Freeman (2009), found 
that corruption negatively effects investments in transition countries but not in Latin 
American, Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African ones. However, they like the current paper do 
not control for difference in FDI sources. 
The result in model six is in accordance with the intuition in the second section that rent-
seeking attitude by state officials is abhorred by multinationals because it imposes costs of 
unpredictable magnitude on them, undermining their ability to forecast and budget their 
expected outlays and perform optimally. It could also be expected given that the major FDI 
exporters, that is, the OECD nations are signatories of the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which came into 
force on 15 February, 1999 (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006)
4
. The explanatory power of the model 
also instantly increases on average by twenty percent from 44 % to 66 % by introducing the 
country ratings from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This upward shift in the R-
squared (R
2
) sustains throughout table three. 
Bureaucracy quality is also significantly positive at one percent level (model seven). The 
political risk services (PRS) group awards better ratings to countries where bureaucracy is 
free of political pressure, have an established transparent mechanism of recruitment, training, 
postings, promotions and have the ability to act as a shock absorber in case of frequent 
government changes which habitually bring policy revisions. 
Knowing that all sample countries except India have seen unsystematic regime changes 
between dictatorships and democracies, leading to drastic shifts in governing principles, this 
role of bureaucracy is extremely important. For example, former regulations may still be on 
the books while the new ones are developed and gazetted. This creates new possibilities for 
the corrupt bureaucrats to fleece investors, as it is not certain, which set of rules and laws, are 
applicable. Realising this government stability is tested in model eight of table three. Its 
significant positive coefficient exhibits that, consistency of policies is important because 
recurrent regime changes can create regulatory vacuum in the interim and foreign as well as 
local firms have to face vacuity of legal structure governing their operations, which is not 
very appealing for overseas investors. Also evident from the same model is the positive 
significant coefficient of bureaucratic quality. It seems logical because the quality and 
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institutional strength of the host country bureaucracy can minimize revisions of policy when 
governments change. 
5. Conclusion 
The present study was an effort to analyse the effect of prevalent corruption in South Asia 
on potential overseas direct investors from the world. The research on multinational direct 
overseas investment and the factors affecting it is not only intriguing but also extremely 
important for understanding the globalisation of the world economy. Though, researchers 
have considerably added to the FDI literature, the phenomenon is complicated enough, that in 
many ways we are still in the process of uncovering what we don't know and this paper may 
help in filling some remaining gaps and add to the existing literature. 
Using data on aggregate FDI in four SAARC countries from 1985 to 2008, it was found 
that multinationals seek larger, relatively developed open markets. Efficient, reliable 
bureaucracy, free of corruption state apparatus as well as government stability are the sought 
after traits of the host economy. Collectively the investors have an aversion for corruption 
and fancy states where the polity is more accountable to people.  
In a nutshell, I intend to stress that corruption is seldom virtuous and renders otherwise 
good government bad and bad government worse, dissipating resources and sufficiently 
adding to transaction costs for the investors to significantly deter them from investment. 
Consequently, I believe that existence of credible bureaucracy and absence of corruption are 
positively correlated and shall therefore, enhance FDI inflows. 
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% of World 
South Asia as 
% of World 
South Asia as % 
of Developing 
1985 56. 851 44. 293 12. 557 0. 264 22. 09 % 0.46 % 2.10 % 
1986 85. 531 75. 419 10. 112 0. 262 11. 82 % 0.31 % 2.59 % 
1987 129. 723 119. 415 10. 308 0. 410 7. 95 % 0.32 % 3.99 % 
1988 158. 324 139. 267 19. 057 0. 327 12. 04 % 0.21 % 1.72 % 
1989 194. 725 171. 979 22. 746 0. 487 11. 68 % 0.25 % 2.14 % 
1990 204. 345 180. 715 23. 630 0. 541 11. 56 % 0.27 % 2.29 % 
1991 157. 292 124. 042 33. 249 0. 391 21. 14 % 0.25 % 1.18 % 
1992 167. 835 119. 327 48. 508 0. 745 28. 90 % 0.44 % 1.54 % 
1993 220. 258 156. 271 63. 986 1. 114 29. 05 % 0.51 % 1.74 % 
1994 248. 390 161. 966 86. 423 1. 580 34. 79 % 0.64 % 1.83 % 
1995 328. 496 229. 657 98. 839 2. 931 30. 09 % 0.89 % 2.97 % 
1996 374. 092 251. 065 123. 027 3. 511 32. 89 % 0.94 % 2.85 % 
1997 468. 387 305. 092 163. 295 4. 896 34. 86 % 1.05 % 2.99 % 
1998 696. 692 533. 050 163. 641 3. 547 23. 49 % 0.51 % 2.17 % 
1999 1095. 228 923. 636 171. 592 3. 082 15. 67 % 0.28 % 1.80 % 
2000 1519. 370 1359. 683 159. 687 4. 358 10. 51 % 0.29 % 2.73 % 
2001 794. 946 629. 846 165. 100 6. 138 20. 77 % 0.77 % 3.72 % 
2002 736. 812 584. 543 152. 269 6. 704 20. 67 % 0.91 % 4.40 % 
2003 643. 120 488. 573 154. 546 5. 383 24. 03 % 0.84 % 3.48 % 
2004 752. 231 535. 759 216. 472 7. 588 28. 78 % 1.01 % 3.51 % 
2005 1137. 271 853. 874 283. 397 10. 914 24. 92 % 0.96 % 3.85 % 
2006 1498. 686 1132. 463 366. 222 26. 041 24. 44 % 1.74 % 7.11 % 
2007 2322. 882 1787. 003 535. 878 32. 315 23. 07 % 1.39 % 6.03 % 
2008 1823. 281 1225. 274 598. 006 48. 678 32. 80 % 2.67 % 8.14 % 
 
Appendix 2 
FDI Inflows in South Asia 1985 to 2008 in Millions of US Dollars at Current Prices 
Year South Asia Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka 
1985 264. 2913 -6. 6600 106. 0900 131. 3893 26. 1621 
1986 262. 1900 2. 4365 117. 7300 105. 7303 29. 7231 
1987 410. 8969 3. 2051 212. 3200 129. 3776 59. 5042 
1988 327. 1823 1. 8382 91. 2500 186. 4916 45. 7225 
1989 487. 5091 0. 2479 252. 1000 210. 5999 19. 7413 
1990 541. 6869 3. 2388 236. 6900 245. 2630 43. 3551 
1991 391. 0117 1. 3904 73. 5376 258. 4145 48. 3492 
1992 745. 9400 3. 7219 276. 5124 336. 4799 122. 6258 
1993 1114. 3559 14. 0499 550. 3700 348. 5570 194. 4791 
1994 1580. 5997 11. 1478 973. 2715 421. 0246 166. 4129 
1995 2931. 4323 1. 8964 2143. 6281 722. 6316 55. 9956 
1996 3511. 3128 13. 5298 2426. 0570 921. 9762 119. 8743 
1997 4896. 7808 139. 3762 3577. 3300 716. 2531 430. 0562 
1998 3547. 6777 190. 0594 2634. 6517 506. 0000 193. 4240 
1999 3082. 3364 179. 6630 2168. 5911 532. 0000 176. 4102 
2000 4358. 0261 280. 3846 3584. 2173 308. 0000 172. 9414 
2001 6138. 1572 78. 5270 5471. 9472 383. 0000 171. 7901 
2002 6704. 6742 52. 3395 5626. 0395 823. 0000 196. 5004 
2003 5383. 0964 268. 2852 4322. 7477 534. 0000 228. 7200 
2004 7588. 7437 448. 9054 5771. 2972 1118. 0000 232. 8000 
2005 10914. 0913 813. 3220 7606. 4252 2201. 0000 272. 4000 
2006 26040. 8208 697. 2063 20335. 9474 4273. 0000 479. 7000 
2007 32315. 0063 652. 8187 25127. 1559 5590. 0000 603. 0000 






FDI inflows in SAARC Countries 1985 to 2008 
Year South Asia 
Bangladesh as % of South 
Asia 
India as % of 
South Asia 
Pakistan as % of 
South Asia 
Sri Lanka as % 
of South Asia 
1985 264291332 -2.52 % 40. 14 % 49. 71 % 9. 89 % 
1986 262189951 0.93 % 44. 90 % 40. 33 % 11. 34 % 
1987 410896932 0.78 % 51. 67 % 31. 49 % 14. 48 % 
1988 327182328 0.56 % 27. 89 % 56. 99 % 13. 97 % 
1989 487509138 0.05 % 51. 71 % 43. 19 % 4. 05 % 
1990 541686864 0.59 % 43. 69 % 45. 28 % 8. 0 % 
1991 391011744 0.36 % 18. 81 % 66. 09 % 12. 37 % 
1992 745939993 0.49 % 37. 07 % 45. 11 % 16. 44 % 
1993 1114355940 1.26 % 49. 39 % 31. 28 % 17. 45 % 
1994 1580599702 0.71 % 61. 58 % 26. 64 % 10. 53 % 
1995 2931432341 0.06 % 73. 13 % 24. 65 % 1. 91 % 
1996 3511312809 0.39 % 69. 09 % 26. 26 % 3. 41 % 
1997 4896780824 2.85 % 73. 05 % 14. 63 % 8. 78 % 
1998 3547677680 5.36 % 74. 26 % 14. 26 % 5. 45 % 
1999 3082336446 5.83 % 70. 36 % 17. 26 % 5. 72 % 
2000 4358026129 6.43 % 82. 24 % 7. 07 % 3. 97 % 
2001 6138157157 1.28 % 89. 15 % 6. 24 % 2. 79 % 
2002 6704674249 0.78 % 83. 91 % 12. 28 % 2. 93 % 
2003 5383096440 4.98 % 80. 30 % 9. 92 % 4. 25 % 
2004 7588743658 5.92 % 76. 05 % 14. 73 % 3. 07 % 
2005 10914091277 7.45 % 69. 69 % 20. 17 % 2. 49 % 
2006 26040820813 2.68 % 78. 09 % 16. 41 % 1. 84 % 
2007 32315006346 2.02 % 77. 76 % 17. 29 % 1. 87 % 
2008 48678335487 1.99 % 84. 57 % 11. 17 % 1. 55 % 
 
